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A Descriptive Model to Analyze Asymmetric Multilateral Negotiations 
 
Majid Sheikhmohammady, Kaveh Madani 
 
Abstract 
 
In multi-lateral negotiations, parties can use their power (political, military, economic, 
etc.) to affect the final outcome of the game. In these games which are usually 
asymmetric, due to uneven powers of the negotiators, players seek reaching their most 
preferable outcome for which they can gain support from the other players. Conventional 
conflict resolution methods do not consider the power of negotiators as an element of the 
analysis. Here, we propose a method for studying multilateral asymmetric negotiations. 
This method considers the power of the negotiator as a determining factor in finding the 
final resolution. The proposed method is applied to find the most likely outcome of an 
international water conflict which has remained unresolved since 1993. In this game, five 
costal countries have been negotiating over the legal status of Caspian Sea without 
reaching any success, resulting in tragedy of the commons. The results of this study are 
compared with those of other studies on Caspian Sea conflict where the powers of 
decision makers have not been taken into account in the analysis.  
 
Introduction  
 
Kersten (2002) defines negotiation as “a process of social interaction and communication 
that involves the distribution and redistribution of power, resources, and commitments”.  
Although there are many approaches to the theory and practice of negotiation, they all 
fall into one of the only two fundamental categories: 1) Positional negotiation, also called 
contentious or competitive negotiation; and 2) Integrative negotiation, also known as 
cooperative problem solving or group decision making. Positional negotiation is often 
referred to as hard bargaining, while integrative negotiation is soft. Hard bargaining 
focuses on winning, avoids compromise, may include hidden agendas, and may result in 
one-sided agreements. In contrast, soft bargaining is adaptable, focuses on finding 
win/win solutions, encourages compromise, and sometimes creates innovative solutions 
(Fisher et al., 1991). This research falls generally within the first category, but seeks to 
integrate ideas from both.  
 
One common classification of models is as normative (prescriptive), and descriptive. 
However, this categorization is not exclusive, and one cannot necessarily ascribe a given 
model or methodology to only one category. The method which we propose here is 
mostly descriptive. The main objective of this method is to identify the most likely 
outcomes of a particular form of multilateral negotiation, based on the capabilities of the 
decision makers and their preferences over the known available alternatives. The 
negotiation problems modeled and analyzed by this method are distinctive because the set 
of possible agreements is discrete and pre-specified. Each decision maker has two 
concerns: first, achieving an alternative which is as preferred as possible; and second, 
building support among the other decision makers for this alternative. This method only 
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requires each decision maker’s preference ordering of the alternatives, and does not 
require cardinal measures of preference. Generally, this method is applicable to 
multilateral negotiations with the following characteristics: 
 
1) Decision makers in the negotiation look for a feasible resolution, in other words, a 
stable or enduring agreement. Apparently, each negotiator tries to attain his/her most 
preferable agreement. 
 
2) If an agreement is reached, it must be an alternative from a pre-specified list, 
which all decision makers must accept. 
 
3) Decision makers can possess different levels of capability (power or legitimacy) 
in support of an agreement, so the negotiation is not necessarily symmetric. 
 
Proposed Definitions and Method 
 
We now propose new definitions to identify the likely agreements and specify their 
likelihoods. Suppose that { }1,2,3,...,N n=  is the set of all decision makers (DMs) in the 
negotiation, and { }, ,...,1 2A a a aq= is the set of all alternative agreements. We assume  
and .  
2n ≥
2q ≥
 
Definition 1: DMs’ Preference Rankings over Agreements 
 
For i ,  is DM i’s weak preference relation on A. Thus,  means i prefers 
 to 
N∈ if% k i ja af%
ka ja or is indifferent between andka ja . The relation  is assumed to be reflexive 
and complete. Strict preference for DM i is the relation  , defined on A by  
iff  and ¬ ( , where ¬ means negation. For i
if%
if a ak i jf
k i ja af% )j i ka af% N∈ ,  is DM i’s  
indifference relation on A;
i 
j i ka a   iff a  and ak i jf% j i ka af% . Preferences are usually 
transitive but not always, and the methodology developed herein can be used even 
when preferences are intransitive. We define { }( ) 1 :i j i jP a a A a a= + ∈ f to indicate the 
preference of DM i over the alternative ja . For example  means that 
alternative B is the best alternative according to DM 2. Likewise, 
indicates that DM 3 is indifferent between alternatives A and D and 
considers these alternatives as his or her fourth preference. 
2 ( ) 1P B =
3 3( ) ( ) 4P A P D= =
 
Definition 2: Acceptability 
 
Each DM may be willing to accept only some of the proposed alternatives as the 
outcome of the negotiation. For each DM, acceptability is denoted by a positive 
integer. DM i will accept alternative ja  iff ( )i jP a ≤ iAcc . 
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Definition 3: State 
 
A negotiation state consists of an alternative and a non-empty subset of DMs who 
support that alternative as the outcome of the negotiation. Thus, ( , )a Cj  denotes a 
negotiation state where ja A∈  and . The set of all states is 
. Note that 
,C N C⊆ ≠ ∅
(2 )NS A= × −∅ .(2 1)nS q= − .  
 
Definition 4: Feasibility 
 
An agreement can be implemented iff the supporting coalition is strong enough. 
Hence, a negotiation state is feasible if the coalition defined by the state is strong 
enough to enforce the agreement defined by the state. To reflect the different power 
or legitimacy of DMs in real-world negotiations, we denote , the weight of DM i in 
the negotiation. If the sum of coalition members’ weights is at least equal to the 
threshold, T, then the negotiation state is feasible. T is the minimum strength (total 
weight) of a coalition to enforce an agreement and must be determined before state 
feasibility can be assessed. 
iw
 
In summary, a weight > 0 is assigned to each iw i N∈  and for each  a threshold 
 is determined. A negotiation state ( ,  is feasible iff 
ja A∈
( ) 0jT a > )ja C ( ).i
i C
w T a
∈
≥ j∑  If we 
simplify this further by assuming 
1 2( ) ( ) ... ( )qT a T a T a T= = = =  , then  is feasible 
iff . 
( , )ja C
w Ti
i C
≥∑
∈
 
Definition 5: Stability 
 
A negotiation state from which there is no movement is called stable. Different types 
of movements are defined in later sections. 
 
Definition 6: Fallback Distance (FD) 
 
iFD  is a non-negative integer parameter describing DM i. DM i is willing to make an 
strategic disimprovement and accept rather than ka ja , even though , if 
 . 
k i ja ap
( ) ( )i k i j iP a P a FD− ≤
 
The proposed methodology is based on the analysis of stable states. To determine the 
stable states, we must describe the different possible movements (the likelihood of 
occurrence of different moves is not the same). Members of the coalition of a negotiation 
state might move to another state for the following reasons: 
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1. Preferential Improvement: The members of the coalition find a more preffered 
alternative. 
2. Agglomeration:  One or more extra DMs join the coalition because they support 
the agreement that the coalition is enforcing.  
3. Disloyalty: One or more members of a coalition may form another coalition (on 
their own or along with other DMs) to support another agreement. 
4. Strategic Disimprovement: One or more members of a coalition may join another 
coalition supporting an agreement that is less peffered. This strategic 
disimprovement must be a move from an infeasible state to a feasible one.  
 
Caspian Sea Conflict 
 
The Caspian Sea, the largest lake on the earth, has been the subject of one of the world’s 
most intractable disputes, involving five littoral states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Iran, 
Russia, and Turkmenistan since the collapse of the Union of the Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) in 1991. Before this time, the Caspian Sea was shared by Iran and the 
USSR and two countries were enjoying a stable relationship based on two mutual treaties 
of 1921 and 1941. Currently, there are five states bordering the Caspian Sea and there is a 
dispute over who owns which part of the Caspian Sea, or whether the five littoral states 
share the entire sea in some sense. The main motivation of the five states is the existence 
of immense amounts of petroleum in the seabed. Since 1992, the five littoral states have 
met on 26 occasions, at the presidential, ministerial and expert levels, in all five states 
and in many different cities. The last presidential negotiating meeting was held in 
October 2007 in Tehran. The lack of resolution has resulted in tragedy of the commons 
where petroleum production is increasing pollution and overfishing is contributing to the 
environmental degradation of this valuable natural resource. (Sheikhmohammady and 
Madani, 2008a)  
 
Sheikhmohammady and Madani (2008a, 2008b) provided more details about the Caspian 
Sea conflict. Based on their discussion, five alternatives are available to resolve the legal 
status of the Caspian Sea, denoted as follows: 
 
C: Condominium 
Dm: Division based on the International Law applying to Seas 
De: Equal Division (20 percent of the sea, and the seabed goes to each littoral state) 
Ds: Division based on Soviet maps 
DC: Division of the seabed based on International Law, and condominium on the surface 
 
Based on assessments of the countries’ national economic, political and military interests, 
and on their public statements, it is possible to infer that each state has strict preferences 
over the five alternatives. The states’ preferences are as follows (where “>” means 
“strictly prefers”):  
 
Azerbaijan: s m eD D DC D C> > > >  
Iran:  e mC D D DC D> > > > s
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Kazakhstan: s m eD D DC C D> > > >  
Russia: s m eC DC D D D> > > >  
Turkmenistan: e s mD D D DC C> > > >  
 
It is important to note that “Equal Division” does not result in equal shares in the 
revenue. Each state would receive 20 percent of the total surface (and seabed) of the 
Caspian Sea, located adjacent to its shores. Since oil and gas resources are not uniformly 
distributed across the sea, the distribution of resources among states would be unequal. In 
contrast, the condominium alternative proposes that each state simply receive an equal 
share of the total revenue from joint exploitation of the resources. 
 
Decision Makers’ Weights in the Caspian Sea Negotiations 
 
The most challenging step in modeling the Caspian Sea negotiations based on the 
proposed methodology is estimation of the DMs’ weights. In cases such as the Caspian 
Sea conflict estimation of the DM’s weights is not as straightforward as cases such as the 
decision mechanism of the Security Council of the United Nations or the voting system 
of the European Union. In these examples, DMs’ weights reflect their level of legitimacy 
in the voting system and modeling is easier than cased in which the weights of the DMs 
are not clearly stipulated. DMs’ weights in the Caspian Sea conflict must be determined 
based on their capabilities in the negotiation process.  
 
The powers of the DMs must be estimated quantitatively by the analyst. In these cases, 
the fundamental issue is the notion of power itself: What enables one party to gain 
something from another patty in a negotiation? Power is a basic concept in both physics 
and political science. To the physicist, power has a precise definition, nevertheless, to the 
political scientist, it is vague. It is hard to go very deep into an analysis of negotiations 
without invoking the concept of power. The natural science definition of power faces 
many conceptual problems when it is imported into the social sciences. In physics, power 
is defined simply as work done divided by the time taken to accomplish it. Time has a 
standard measurement and work is defined by the force, which is required to move an 
object, and the distance. Since the early 1930s, social scientists have had a good working 
definition of power as the ability of one party to move another party in an intended 
direction. However, there are two main difficulties in measurement of power. First, 
resources come in many shapes and sizes, making it difficult to aggregate them within a 
single measure. Second, resources sometimes come shapelessly, for instance in 
leadership or moral rights, obligations, or commitments. Therefore, it is very difficult to 
measure precisely the power of DMs in negotiations. 
 
In the negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea, the weights of the decision 
makers are not pre-specified. We proceed to estimate the power of the countries involved 
in these negotiations by applying a Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) model. 
It should be emphasised that this is only an estimation and that precise measurement of 
the nations’ powers is not possible because some criteria like diplomatic efforts or 
negotiators’ tactical skills are not quantified and therefore, cannot be easily measured.  
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Table 1 lists all criteria that are considered to be important determinants of countries’ 
capabilities in the Caspian Sea negotiations. For each criterion, associated indicators are 
also given.  
 
Table 1. Criteria and associated indicators applied to estimate the weights of the 
negotiators involved in the Caspian Sea Conflict 
Criteria Indicators 
Economic Independence 
and Self-Sufficiency 
GNI/capita 
Net trade / GDP 
GDP/ Claimed Caspian Sea Oil and Natural Gas 
Military Status of the 
Country 
Annual Military Expenditures 
Military Expenditures/ GDP 
Active Troops/ Population 
Nuclear Power Status 
US Support 
US Financial Support 
US Political Support 
Political Influence and 
Structure 
The Territory of Political Influence 
Democracy Level  
 
To evaluate the weights of the decision makers in the negotiations over the Caspian Sea, 
the importance of each criterion should be determined. The Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) method can be applied to find the most favourable set of relative importance of 
different criteria for each country. We use the DEA method to combine indicator values 
to obtain weights for the countries. DEA is an increasingly popular management decision 
tool initially proposed by Charnes et al. (1978). It is a linear programming based 
technique originally designed to measure the relative performance of a number of 
producers or decision making units, where the presence of multiple inputs and outputs 
makes comparisons difficult. During the last decades, a significant amount of research 
has focused on DEA for both theoretical extensions and practical applications. Cook and 
Kress (1994) discussed relationships between DEA and MCDA and proposed a DEA-
based MCDA method to handle both cardinal and ordinal criteria. Based on the DEA 
concept, the weight of a criterion for a specific country could be different from the weight 
of that criterion for another country. The comparison is conducted in a fair manner by 
permitting each country to maximize its possibility of obtaining the best aggregate 
evaluation result.  
 
Different parameters Caspian Sea negotiations model are shown in Table 2. The numbers 
in the weight column of this Table are the results of applying a MCDM model using the 
DEA method. Acceptability and Fallback Distance of the five Caspian Sea states were 
calculated by using definitions 2 and 6 based on the historical background of the conflict. 
 
Table 2. Negotiation parameters  
Country Weight Acceptability Fallback Distance 
Azerbaijan 4.91 2 1 
Iran 4.55  1 1 
Kazakhstan 4.48 2 1 
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Russia 9.98 1 1 
Turkmenistan 3.26 3 1 
 
In the Caspian Sea negotiations, there are five decision makers and five alternatives, so 
the number of the negotiation states is . We know that some bilateral 
treaties or multilateral agreements among some of the five states have already occurred 
since the collapse of the USSR. But these agreements may not endure, because the five 
presidents of the Caspian Sea states agreed, in their joint declaration at the end of the 
Tehran meeting in October 2007 that the legal regime of the Caspian Sea should be 
determined unanimously. 
55 (2 1) 155× − =
 
Results 
 
We applied the proposed methodology to predict the most likely outcomes of the Caspian 
Sea negotiations. Since the five Caspian Sea states have agreed that the legal regime of 
the Caspian Sea should be determined unanimously, it is reasonable that the threshold of 
all alternatives is set at T= 27. In this case, only unanimous agreements over the five 
alternatives are feasible. There are 38 stable states, however, only the five unanimous 
agreements are feasible. Results indicate that among the five unanimous agreements, 
state { }( , , , , , )mD A I K R T  is the most likely enduring legal status of the Caspian Sea, and 
{ }( , , , , , )sD A I K R T  is second most likely. In other words, unanimous agreement over the 
division of the Caspian Sea based on International Law applying to Seas is the most 
likely state that might evolve as the ultimate outcome of the negotiations. Under this 
division method, also known as “sectoral division”, full maritime boundaries of the five 
countries would be established based on the median lines from the shores of the littoral 
states, using the principle of equidistance to divide the sea and the undersea resources 
into national sectors” (Sheikhmohammady and Madani, 2008a). 
 
Discussion 
 
Table 3 shows the predicted outcome of Caspian Sea negotiations based on different 
methods which have been applied to this case. The previous studies on Caspian Sea 
conflict had applied normative methods for predicting the outcome and therefore, their 
results are different from the mostly descriptive method which was used.  The normative 
methods used before had ignored the powers of negotiators in this conflict while the 
proposed method addresses the powers of the parties in negotiations.  The majority of 
previously applied methods had found Ds (division based on the Soviet Maps) as the final 
resolution of this conflict while Dm was found to be the final outcome of the negotiations 
when the parties use their powers to change the outcome to increase their gain. If 
negotiators use their power (which is always true for cases like the example studied here), 
the final outcome might not necessarily be socially optimal (as suggested by Social 
Choice rules), belong to the compromise set of the problems in which negotiators have 
equal powers (Fallback Bargaining Procedures), be the state which is stable under 
different solution concepts for static games (found by Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution (GMCR)).  
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Table 3. Predicted outcome of Caspian Sea negotiations based on different methods 
Method Rule Result Concept 
Proposed Method ---------- Dm Predicted Outcome  
Condorcet Choice Ds
Borda Scoring Ds
Plurality Rule Ds or C 
Majoritarian Compromise (MC) Ds
Median Voting Rule (MVR) Ds
Social Choice Rules 
(Sheikhmohammady and 
Madani, 2008a) 
Condorcet’s Practical Method 
(CPM) Ds
Socially Optimal 
Alternative 
Unanimity Fallback Bargaining 
(UFB) DC or Dm
3-Approval Fallback 
Bargaining (3-Approval FB) Ds or Dm
4-Approval Fallback 
Bargaining (4-Approval FB) Ds
Fallback Bargaining 
Procedures 
(Sheikhmohammady and 
Madani, 2008a) 
Fallback Bargaining with 
Impasse 
No 
Agreement 
Compromise Set 
Graph Model for 
Conflict Resolution 
(GMCR) 
(Sheikhmohammady el al., 
2006) 
---------- De Equilibrium 
 
Conclusions 
 
A new methodology was applied to identify the most likely outcome of the continuing 
negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea, considering the powers of the 
conflict parties. We found division based on International Law applying to Seas as the 
ultimate legal status of the Caspian Sea. Comparison of the result of this study with 
previous studies on this conflict shows that normative methods predict a different 
outcome for this conflict. However, those methods do not consider the powers of 
negotiators in the conflict and therefore, their results might not well reflect the reality of 
this conflict.   
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